My previous blog on threat modeling for managed attribution presented a basic framework for analyzing the MA solutions you might use to protect your online operations. In this post, I further analyze the kinds of information that could be visible to the various categories of threat actors.
Many entities could act as potential threats when you execute your online missions. Depending on the threat actor’s attitudes and capabilities, the severity of these threats can vary.
The internet has become an incredibly visual medium. Faces are everywhere online, particularly in social media. But, if you are trying to go online under an alias, faces can create a major problem.
Bitcoin could actually put you at risk of exposing your alias. But with the proper precautions and rigorous OPSEC, your mission objectives remain feasible, even while manipulating bitcoin.
This blog highlights the FireFox Lightbeam tool that shows how many third party sites that are viewing your activity when you visit a given website. I also discuss the only way to mitigate this ubiquitous monitoring—perfecting your OPSEC and managing your online fingerprint.
In this episode of the series, I apply our threat model to a scenario with significantly higher vulnerability than the last. In this example, the client is conducting active engagement with an overseas illegal marketplace operated by the target.
Part 2 of this 3-part series, Lance applies the managed attribution threat model to an OSINT scenario. The MA requirement here is for the operator to blend in with a highly paranoid group while avoiding detection as an alias by the social media platform they are using.
Threat modeling for managed attribution systems requires a different methodology. We have developed a new framework that combats threats that are specific to managed attribution.
The most effective way to expose online identities and aliases is a technique called the Canary Trap or the Barium Meal Test. None of the standard managed attribution practices are effective in thwarting it because it attacks the human operator, rendering most tools ineffective.
When conducting intelligence operations, it is important to avoid attention.We have all heard the advice, “When in Rome, do as the Romans do,” but how do we achieve that when we are in Rome.com? What different factors will make us stand out from the crowd and attract unwanted attention during online operations? ...
